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In this action arising out of an automobile collision in Missouri,
plaintiffs, Lee Reich and his son Jeffry, sued for the wrongful death
of Mrs. Reich and son Jay. At the time of the accident the plaintiffs
and decedents were residents of Ohio, however, at the time of suit
the plaintiffs had become residents of California. The decedents'
estates were being administered in Ohio. Defendant Purcell, owner
and operator of the other automobile involved, was at all times a resident of California. The sole issue on appeal was the amount recoverable for the wrongful death of Mrs. Reich. Neither California 1
nor Ohio2 law limits the damages recoverable for wrongful death,
however, Missouri law limits damages to $25,000. 3 The parties
stipulated that judgment be entered for $25,000 or $55,000, depending on whether the Missouri limitation applied. The trial court ruled
that the Missouri limitation applied, and the District Court of Appeal
affirmed.- On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, held,
reversed: The state where plaintiffs and decedents resided at the time
of injury and where decedents' estates are being administered has a
greater interest in the issue of damages recoverable in a wrongful
death action than the forum or the state where the accident occurred,
and the law of that state will be applied to determine the amount of
damages. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Adv. Cal. 560, 432 P.2d 727, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 31 (1967).
With this decision California departed from the traditional rule
of lex lod delicti, which requires that an action in tort be governed
by the law of the state where the tort was committed.5 The theory
1 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 377 (West 1954).

2 OHio CONST. art. I, § 19a. "The amount of damages recoverable by civil action
in the courts for death caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another, shall

not be limited by law."
3 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.090 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1967) (increasing the
amount recoverable to $50,000).
4 Reich v. Purcell, 250 Adv. Cal. App. 207, 58 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1967).
5 See, e.g., Slater v. Mex. Natl R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Loranger v. Nadeau,
215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63 (1932); Victor v. Sperry, 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 329 P.2d 63
(1958); Hanna v. Grand Trunk R.R., 41 Ill. App. 116 (1891); Petrusha v. Korinek,
237 Mich. 583, 213 N.W. 188 (1927); McCabe v. Duluth St. Ry., 175 Man. 22,
220 N.W. 162 (1928); Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230

N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962). See also RESTATEMENT
412 (1934).
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supporting lex loci is that the place of the wrong has the sole power
to create a right or an obligation, which follows the tortfeasor and
may be enforced wherever he can be sued. The forum's function is to
enforce the "vested right" or "obligation" created by the foreign
law.6
Some years ago the "vested rights" theory was attacked by Professor Walter Wheeler Cook. First he criticized the concept of
"vested rights." Although he accepted Justice Holmes' definition of a
legal right-the imaginary substance of a prediction that some public
force will be brought to bear 8 -Cook argued that a mere prediction
of the actions of public authorities is not something which "vests" or
is "carried" about.
Examining the process by which most courts employed the laws of
foreign jurisdictions, Cook also concluded that in fact "vested rights"
were not being enforced. He noted that the courts did not consider
what the foreign jurisdiction would do if the same case were adjudicated there, for they took no account of the whole law of the foreign
jurisdiction, i.e., the choice-of-law rules applicable to litigation involving foreign elements. The courts were considering only what the
foreign jurisdiction would do when faced with similar facts involving only domestic elements. Therefore, the courts were not enforcing
"vested rights" created by the law of a foreign jurisdiction, but rather
the forum was looking to the foreign jurisdiction for a rule of
decision to apply to the case at bar. If the forum was not enforcing
foreign law it could only be enforcing its own law.
This "local law" theory expounded by Professor Cook was recognized by Chief Justice Traynor in Reich:
[C] omplex cases elucidate what the simpler cases obscured, namely,
that the forum can only apply its own law.... When it purports
to do otherwise it is not enforcing foreign rights but choosing a
foreign rule of decision as the appropriate one to apply to the case
before it.1o
6 Slater v. Mex. Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
7 Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YAL L.J. 457
(1924).
8 0.W. HOLMES, COLLECrED LEGAL PAPERS, 313 (1920). Note that Justice Holmes
was the author of Slater v. Mex. Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904), the source of the
oft-quoted statement of vested rights theory.
9 See note 7 supra. Judge Learned Hand, also an advocate of local law theory,
reasoned that the forum creates a right modelled on the right created in the foreign
jurisdiction. For a comparison of this view with Professor Cook's, see Cavers, The Two
"Local Law" Theories, 63 HARv. L. REv. 822 (1950).
10 67 Adv. Cal. at 562, 432 P.2d at 729, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 33 (citations omitted).
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The "vested rights" theory has also been attacked because in a multistate transaction it resulted in a mechanical rule which could defeat
the legitimate interests of the litigants and the states involved. 1 This
is particularly true in tort actions where the place of injury is fortuitous. For instance, if two California drivers collide in Nevada, the
rejection of California law may deny the obvious interest that California has in governing rights and obligations between its citizens.
Though Nevada has an interest in conduct within its borders, it has
no interest, where non-residents are concerned, in such issues as the
statute of limitations, prejudgment interest or limitation on liability.
To give effect to Nevada law on these issues advances no interest of
Nevada, while it sacrifices legitimate interests of California.
Although "local law" theory seemed to discredit "vested rights,"
many judges remained unconvinced. To overcome the lex loci rule and
give effect to the interests of the parties and states, concerned judges
resorted to devices such as "characterization." Two California cases
illustrate. In Grant v. McAuliffe' 2 the law of Arizona, where the
automobile accident occurred, did not provide for survival of actions
beyond the tortfeasor's death. In order to allow the California plaintiff
recovery from the California administrator of the deceased tortfeasor's estate, the court characterized survival of actions as procedural and thus determined by the law of California. In Emery v.
Emery'3 the court, which would have had to recognize parental immunity if lex loci had applied, characterized the issue of immunity as
one of family relationships, and ruled that the law of the family
domicile applied. Chief Justice Traynor, author of the two opinions,
implied later that the device of characterization was employed to
win the acceptance of his colleagues who were still imbued with
"vested rights" thinking. 4
Another means employed to circumvent lex loci is to hold the
foreign law contrary to the public policy of the forum. In Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc. 5 plaintiff sued in New York for wrongful
death resulting from an airplane accident which occurred in Massachusetts. The court held: "We will still require plaintiff to sue on the
11 See generally D. CAvERs, T-iE CHOICE-oF-LAW PROCESS 7-8 (1965); B. CURIE,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 5, 6 (1963); A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 548 (1962).

12 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 994 (1953).
13 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
14 Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657, 670 n.35

(1959).
15 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
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Massachusetts statute but we refuse on public policy grounds to
enforce one of its provisions as to damages [$15,000 limitation] ."e

Professor Brainard Currie advocated a forthright governmentalinterest approach in which the forum examines the policies and objectives behind the conflicting laws under consideration.17 From this
examination the forum then determines which states have a legitimate
interest in the application of their law to the particular issue under
consideration. If only one state has a substantial interest, the law of
that state is applied. If both the forum and another state have an
8
interest, the law of the forum is applied. The first state court case'
to openly employ a governmental-interest approach was Babcock v.
Jackson.19 All the parties to the action were residents of New York;
the automobile accident occurred in Ontario. Plaintiff, defendant's
guest, sued for personal injuries in a New York court. The court
determined that Ontario, which has a guest statute, had no interest
in the application of its law to the particular situation, while New
York, which has no guest statute, dearly did have an interest, since
the accident involved only New York residents.
The court stated it was applying a "center of gravity" or "grouping
of contacts" approach, which gives effect to the law of the jurisdiction
which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence, has
the greatest interest in the issue under consideration. 20 The policies
and objectives of the laws were analyzed to determine the importance
of the contacts, dearly reflecting Professor Currie's thinking. Several
decisions followed which adopted outright the Currie governmentalinterest analysis for tort actions. 2 '
16 Id. at 40, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136. The Kilberg court also
employed the device of characterization and ruled that damages were a procedural
matter to be determined by the law of the forum. Id. at 41, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211
N.Y.S.2d at 137.
17 B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183-84 (1963).
18 The case was preceded by the governmental-interest based decision in Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (1962). However, this federal court decision
was not applying New York conflict law as it truly was in 1962. It relied on Kilberg,
which had not squarely adopted the governmental-interest approach for New York.
For a discussion of the recent New York decisions see Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1, also in B. CuaRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THEl
CONFLICT OF LAWS 690 (1963).
19 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).

Id. at 481-82, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965); Tramontana v. S.A. Empressa de
Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Watts v. Pioneer Corn
Co., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965); Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 50
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill.
2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966);
Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Thompson v. Thompson,
20
21
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With Reich California has joined the growing trend: "As the
forum we must consider all of the foreign and domestic elements and
interests involved in the case to determine the rule applicable.""
Chief Justice Traynor pointed out that California had no governmental interest, in that plaintiff moved to California after the accident, and to choose the law according to events after the accident
would encourage forum shopping. Moreover, since California had no
limitation on damages for wrongful death, it had no interest in
limiting the liability of defendant, a California resident.
Missouri likewise had no interest? The purpose of Missouri's
limitation on damages was to protect its residents from excessive
judgments, not to protect travelers from states having no limitation.
Finally, Chief Justice Traynor determined that Ohio had an interest
in affording injured plaintiffs full recovery, expressed in a state constitutional provision2 4 that damages for personal injury or death shall
not be limited by law. Plaintiffs and decedents had resided in Ohio
and decedents' estates were being administered there, so absent any
real conflict with Missouri or California, Ohio's interest was given
effect in awarding the plaintiff $55,000.5
Reich illustrates the situation where no real conflict existed between
any states which had contact with the transaction, since neither
California nor Missouri had any substantial interest in applying their
law. Ohio law was chosen by a process of elimination, not by a
resolution of conflict. A conflict may have been presented if the court
had given greater recognition to the California domicile of plaintiffs,
even though plaintiffs had moved to California after the accident.
In a similar situation, Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 6 the plaintiff
had moved to Maryland from New York one month after the airplane crash from which the wrongful death action arose, yet the
court held that Maryland law was applicable. The Reich court did not
reach a similar result because it sought to prevent forum shopping.
However, the Reich decision actually encourages forum shopping.
Although the court stated that "[P]laintiffs receive no more than
105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963); Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 16
N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965); Griffith v. United Airlines,
Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
22 67 Adv. Cal. at 564, 432 P.2d at 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
23 Id. at 565, 432 P.2d at 730-31, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34-35.
24 OMo CONsT. art. I, § 19a.
25 67 Adv. Cal. at 566, 423 P.2d at 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34.

26 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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they would had they been injured at home," 2 it did not mention what
would have happened if the plaintiffs had brought their action in
Ohio. If the Reichs had brought their action in Ohio instead of
California, an Ohio court, unless it chose the occasion to change its
choice-of-law rule, would have applied Missouri law under lex loci.28
Plaintiffs would then have recovered only $25,000, a result far
different than the Reich judgment for $55,000. Thus, any plaintiffs
injured by California drivers in states with limitations on damages
are encouraged to sue in California whenever their own state would
apply lex loci.
By not referring to the "whole law" of Ohio, i.e., not employing
renvoi, Chief Justice Traynor was being consistent with Currie's
governmental-interest approach:
Foreign law would be applied only when the court has determined
that the foreign state has a legitimate interest in the application of
its law and policy to the case at bar and the forum has none. Hence,
there can be no question of applying anything other than the internal
law of the foreign state.29

It is only through examination of the policies and objectives of a
state's internal law concerning the particular issue that a forum can
determine that a state has an interest. Moreover, the interest so
determined is an interest in the application of the particular internal
law.30 Yet renvoi may still serve a useful purpose. If a court was
bound by a conflict rule of lex loci, it could refer to the "whole law"
of the place of the wrong, which might in turn lead the court to the
law of another jurisdiction, which could be used to achieve the right
result. California courts may never have any need for renvoi, but
judges of other states may employ the doctrine to persuade colleagues,
reluctant to depart from vested rights dogma, to accept a desired
result 1
Of course, even California courts can refer to the choice-of-law
rules of a foreign jurisdiction to test the strength of the latter's interest in the application of its internal laws. For instance, the Ohio
27
28

67 Adv. Cal. at 565, 432 P.2d 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
See Goranson v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 345 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965); Ellis v.

Garwood, 168 Ohio St. 241, 152 N.E.2d 100 (1958).

B. CURIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 184 (1963).
For an apparent misapplication of renvoi, see Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
31 See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). The court employed renvoi
for the purpose of reconciling the lex lod rule of the Federal Tort Claims Act with
whaf the court predicted was a trend toward governmental-interest analysis.
29
SO
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Constitution apparently expresses a strong policy against limitation
of damages in wrongful death actions.3 2 However, considering Ohio
conflicts law, the policy does not appear nearly as strong. Since the
Ohio choice-of-law rule is lex loci, it would ignore its own constitution and apply the Missouri limitation if an action was brought based
on a tort occurring in Missouri.
With the Reich decision California has adopted an approach to
choice-of-law problems but no rules of choice. Since the court had
determined that no real conflict was involved, there was no opportunity to formulate a specific rule for resolving a true conflict between the
legitimate interests of two or more states. In the true conflict situation
Professor Currie has argued that the problem cannot be solved
rationally by any conflict of laws method. Since any choice of law
will subordinate the interest of one state, he urges that the forum not
subordinate its own interests for the sake of interstate uniformity of
law 3 It seems that Chief Justice Traynor would agree: "The likelihood is that, freed of metaphysical rules of choice of law, the forum
court will let the
local interest prevail and sacrifice the interest of
34
the other state."
However, in Bernkrant v. Fowler 5 a true conflict occurred, and
Chief Justice Traynor did not give effect to California's interest in
the matter. The case involved an oral contract to make a will, which
was unenforceable under California's Statute of Frauds, but enforceable under Nevada law. The contract was formed in Nevada;
the promisor later died while a resident of California. Although
California had an interest in protecting estates being probated in
California from false claims based on alleged oral contracts to make
wills, the court ruled that Nevada law applied, and the contract was
held enforceable. The court actually avoided the conflict by stating
that California had no interest in applying its own Statute of Frauds.
Since the decedent had not been continuously domiciled in California,
the parties were not expected to know that California law might apply
to the contract. In the interest of preserving the parties' expectations
that Nevada law would apply, the court denied California's interest.
Thus it appears California cannot be relied upon to invoke a rule of
forum-preference in true conflict situations; nor will it always take a
§ 19a.
83 B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183-84 (1963).
84 Traynor, IsThis Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657, 674 (1959).
32 OHIo CoNsT. art. I,

85 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1961).
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restrained view of its own interest to the point of denying it in order
to avoid a true conflict.36
Recognizing the possibility of ad hoc decisions in true conflict
cases, Professor Cavers has attempted to engraft upon the governmental-interest approach some tentative rules that would give effect
to strictly choice-of-law considerations, such as certainty of result,
predictability, and the expectations of the parties.3 7 These rules are
no more than his predictions of what the case law will reflect after a
number of decisions are rendered in similar fact situations. The
Reich facts, if they had presented a true conflict, would fall under the
following tort principle:
If both plaintiff and defendant have their homes in a state or states
other than the state of injury and if the measure of compensation
under the law of the state of injury affords a lower degree of financial protection than that afforded by the law or laws of the parties'
home state or states, the measure of compensation under the law of
that home state which 38affords the lower degree of financial protection should be applied.
Although California's approach to choice-of-law will give effect
to the interests of the parties and states involved and make just results
more likely, without rules for true conflict situations the results will
be frequently unpredictable. "But the very purpose of this method is
to avoid the pat answer which gives a bad result either to be accepted
as a sacrifice on the altar of certainty or to be avoided by subter' 9
fuge."
DONALD R. WORLEY
36 It seems that Professor Currie has modified his unconditional forum-preference
position, for he said of Bernkrant:
The restraint and moderation with which domestic interests are defined raise
a standard to which the wise and honest can repair, and should be a reproach
to those who feel that the method of govemmental-interest analysis must necessarily produce egocentric or provincial results.
B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws

688-89 n.236 (1963).

37 See D. CAVERs, THE CHOICE-oF-LAw PRocEss 137-80 (1965).
38 Id. at 157-58.

89 Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 622, 133 N.W.2d 408, 417 (1965).

